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T
he increasingly integrated global econ-
omy presents policymakers with both
opportunities and challenges. Global eco-
nomic integration is widely thought to improve
the allocation of resources, promote technology
transfer, and enhance living standards. But, at
the same time, economic integration has fre-
quently been blamed for growing trade imbal-
ances, increased financial market volatility, and
less effective domestic macroeconomic policies. 
To better understand how policymakers can
maximize the benefits from globalization while
recognizing the challenges, the Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City sponsored a symposium
entitled, “Global Economic Integration: Oppor-
tunities and Challenges,” held at Jackson Hole,
Wyoming, on August 24-26, 2000. The sympo-
sium brought together a distinguished group of
central bankers, academics, and financial market
experts. Participants at the symposium agreed
that globalization has produced net economic
benefits for national economies and outlined a
variety of approaches for addressing the associ-
ated challenges.
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION,
FINANCIAL MARKETS, AND TRADE 
The first day of the symposium covered a vari-
ety of issues from various perspectives, including
those of Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan, two financial market regulators, and
several public-sector and academic economists.
The session started with a discussion of the fac-
tors driving global economic integration, then
turned to financial market issues. Academic
economists gave their views on how economic
integration has affected financial market stabil-
ity, and a panel of regulatory specialists dis-
cussed possible policy responses. The day
concluded with an overview of trade issues from
the perspective of the Director-General of the
World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Driving forces
In his opening comments, Chairman
Greenspan defined globalization as “the increas-
ing interaction of national economic systems.”
He linked this trend to technological progress
and to government policies that have promoted
deregulation and privatization in markets
around the world. In particular, technological
improvements have lowered transactions and
information costs, promoting the efficient oper-
ation of market-based economic systems. The
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ated with increased competition and reduced
tariffs and trade barriers.
Looking ahead, Greenspan questioned
whether the trend toward global economic inte-
gration and free markets would continue as rap-
idly as in the past. The central tenants of free
markets—competition and the Schumpeterian
process of “creative destruction”—raise concerns
in some quarters about the unequal distribution
of wealth and the “civility of society.” Accord-
ingly, if the recent period of economic growth
were to subside, support for free markets and
trade liberalization could fade. 
Following Greenspan’s comments, Michael
Mussa examined various factors that have con-
tributed to global economic integration and are
likely to contribute in the future. According to
Mussa, factors driving integration fall into three
categories—technology, preferences, and public
policy. These factors have acted individually and
interactively in driving integration.
Improvements in technology have bolstered
integration by lowering the cost of transporting
goods and people from one place to another and
by reducing the cost of communicating ideas.
Social and individual preferences for the benefits
of globalization—including an increasing vari-
ety of goods and services—have also con-
tributed to integration. In contrast, public
policy has at times promoted integration while
at other times has acted as a barrier to globaliza-
tion. Given these driving forces, Mussa exam-
ined how human migration and increasing trade
and financial flows have defined the process of
global integration. 
In assessing future prospects, Mussa was opti-
mistic. He suggested that the process of integra-
tion would continue because of continued
technical innovation and favorable public poli-
cies. While there is always a risk that those
opposed to globalization will gain political sup-
port, the economic prosperity that global inte-
gration has fostered will likely act as an effective
counterweight. Moreover, despite occasional
financial crises, most nations have shown little
desire to withdraw from the increasingly inte-
grated world economy. In fact, nations that have
lagged behind in the process of integration gen-
erally want to catch up. 
Commenting on Mussa’s paper, Douglas
Irwin agreed that technology, preferences, and
policy have shaped U.S. trade in the 1990s.
Irwin made three key points, focusing on trade.
First, public policy has driven trade flows in the
1990s both on its own terms and in interaction
with technology. Second, public support for
integration is more likely when trade is driven
by technology rather than public policy. And
third, opposition to policies promoting trade has
largely come from special interest groups whose
influence may be waning. 
Irwin shared Mussa’s view that the process of
integration would continue. While unskilled
workers, acting in their own interest, may con-
tinue to resist freer trade, Irwin did not expect a
resurgence of isolationist policies. The key to
enacting trade-expanding policies, he said, is an
educated and highly skilled work force. 
Effects of increased economic integration
on financial stability
After the discussion of factors driving integra-
tion, Paul Krugman examined whether financial
crises might be an inevitable consequence of
globalization. His paper contrasted the view
prevalent in the early 1980s that economic inte-
gration reduced the risk of financial crisis with
the view today that financial crises result from
self-fulfilling panics that can occasionally
develop in an integrated world economy. The
paper then assessed various proposals to reduce
the risk of crisis and discussed how increasing
trade affects the relative merits of alternative
policy solutions.
6 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Kahn.qxd  2/12/01  10:05 AM  Page 6Krugman concluded that the process of glob-
alization did increase the risk of financial crisis.
Moreover, policies that address this increased
risk involve tradeoffs. Policies that reduce the
risk of financial crisis through restrictions on
capital flows do so at a cost that increases with
trade flows. And, policies that protect against
financial crisis through dollarization or “euroiza-
tion” cause all of the adjustment to real shocks
to occur through inflation or deflation. 
Despite these policy tradeoffs, Krugman sug-
gested that, in the long run, increasing trade
could eventually lead to a reduced risk of finan-
cial crisis. He pointed to two reasons. First, as
trade increases relative to national output, so
does the likelihood that a depreciation of the
currency will have net expansionary effects. Sec-
ond, globalization will eventually reduce the
risk of financial crisis because it is associated
with increased direct investment, which is inher-
ently less risky than portfolio investment. 
Commenting on Krugman’s paper, Charles
Goodhart argued that modern financial crises
were not so much the result of global integration
but of financial market deregulation and liberal-
ization. Relatively calm financial markets from
1945 to 1973 were associated with a stable sys-
tem of pegged exchange rates, wide-ranging
controls over capital flows, and strict limitations
on banking activities. The loosening of these reg-
ulations after 1973 produced net economic ben-
efits, but also paved the way for financial crises.
To limit financial crises in the future, Good-
hart advocated the development of domestic
bond and securitized mortgage markets in
emerging economies to reduce the need for
bank and foreign currency borrowing. In addi-
tion, he argued for broadening our concept of
bank and financial market regulation to include
mechanisms for limiting volatile short-term cap-
ital flows. 
How should financial market
regulators respond?
Following the discussion of how economic
integration affects financial stability, a panel of
experts discussed how financial market regula-
tors should respond to the associated challenges. 
Andrew Crockett identified the objectives of
financial regulation as efficiency, stability, and
competitive equity. Efficiency means the price of
risk reflects its cost. Stability means striking a
proper balance between the inevitable and posi-
tive adaptations and changes that occur in a
market system while avoiding the kinds of
instability that carry unacceptable costs. Com-
petitive equity means a state of “genuine com-
petition among institutions,” under which the
benefits of competition are maximized. 
To ensure efficiency, stability, and competitive
equity, Crockett said regulators should not
attempt to resist market forces, but rather
should address market failures. Specifically, he
suggested improving risk management practices
at the firm level, improving supervisory over-
sight techniques, and increasing market disci-
pline through greater transparency and robust
accounting practices. Crockett also identified a
number of practical issues facing policymakers
in a world of increasing economic integration.
Among these issues were the role of regulatory
competition, the coverage of standards across a
variety of financial institutions, and the role of
central banks. 
Howard Davies argued that there was no “sin-
gle silver bullet solution” to addressing the
shortcomings of the current international regu-
latory system. Indeed, he suggested a ten-point
plan to improve the system. The key points in
the plan were: developing globally agreed-upon
standards of disclosure; improving disclosure of
leverage in the financial system; implementing
standards and codes; giving greater considera-
tion to the practical aspects of supervising com-
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sor” for each group of internationally active
institutions; increasing “mutual reliance” among
supervisors; simplifying and rationalizing
national regulatory structures; filling a number
of existing gaps in the regulatory structure;
improving international enforcement; and edu-
cating the public on the implications of global-
ization for saving and investing. 
Randall Kroszner emphasized the role of pri-
vate-sector “regulation” as part of a complete
regulatory system. He put forth the view that
the private sector would continue to “demand”
regulation even as the world economy became
more integrated. But this demand would be
met, not just by public-sector regulators, but
also through the private sector itself. In fact, as
financial market innovation and globalization
make traditional public regulation less effective,
various private sources are providing a greater
share of the supply of regulation. And, competi-
tion among the various public and private sup-
pliers of regulation helps increase the benefits
and reduce the costs of regulation. 
Kroszner identified four forms of private regu-
lation—“members only” organizations, volun-
tary standard-setting bodies, innovative firm
structures, and third-party monitors—that
work together and in competition with tradi-
tional public-sector regulators. After showing
how these private sources of regulation operate
in the derivatives and banking markets,
Kroszner discussed how public regulators have
responded to the globalization of financial mar-
kets. He concluded that the financial market
challenges of globalization could be met
through a “deeper analysis of the robustness of
the private sources of regulation and a further
understanding of how political economy forces
shape the implementation and enforcement of
public regulation.”
World trade policy
In a luncheon address, Mike Moore focused on
the failure of the WTO to launch a new round of
trade talks in Seattle. He suggested the dynam-
ics of the process had changed since the Uruguay
Round, making it unlikely in four key areasthat
a new round could be successfully launched in
the near future. First, controversial issues such as
labor and the environment are now part of the
negotiations. Second, more parties are involved
in the negotiations. Third, popular support for
free trade has declined. And fourth, the need for
leadership and flexibility has increased. 
Given these challenges, Moore concluded that
launching a new round would be difficult but
not impossible. What is required is “sustained
pressure on governments” to generate “the
political will needed to adopt more flexible posi-
tions in sensitive areas.” He drew some opti-
mism from the negotiations on financial services
that are currently under way in Geneva. These
negotiations are proceeding without contro-
versy. They also are demonstrating the speed
with which economic integration has advanced
in the last ten years. 
MACROECONOMIC STABILITY
AND MONETARY POLICY
The second day of the symposium focused on
macroeconomic issues. It started with a discussion
of how economic integration affects macroeco-
nomic stability, then turned to a consideration of
how monetary policymakers should respond to
the challenges of global economic integration.
The day concluded with an overview panel that
addressed what the future might hold.
Effects of increased economic integration
on macroeconomic stability
Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff argued
that globalization has not yet reached the point
where large current account deficits can be sus-
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implications for the world economy. As a result,
the medium-term macroeconomic effects of a
rapid turnaround in the U.S. current account
deficit could be “quite dramatic.” The adjust-
ment could involve a very large depreciation of
the dollar and, at the same time, a sharp drop in
the demand for nontradable goods. 
Obstfeld and Rogoff based their conclusions
on the segmentation—or lack of integration—of
international markets relative to domestic mar-
kets. The segmentation of international markets
is evident from a variety of measures including
international price deviations and home bias in
the demand for both equity and goods. Such
impediments to trade have caused the share of
U.S. goods traded internationally to remain rela-
tively small. In addition, segmentation implies
that large movements in prices and exchange
rates can result from a current account adjust-
ment of 4 to 5 percent of GDP , which is roughly
the size of today’s current account deficit in the
U.S. economy. 
Obstfeld and Rogoff estimated that, if the
U.S. current account were to move rapidly into
balance, the real exchange value of the dollar
could fall by as much as 40 percent or more,
depending on the monetary policy response of
the Federal Reserve. In contrast, they estimated
that a more gradual elimination of the current
account deficit over a period of three to five
years would lead to an adjustment in the real
exchange rate of about 12 percent.
Commenting on Obstfeld and Rogoff’s paper,
Ignazio Visco agreed that international trade was
segmented relative to domestic trade but argued
that segmentation was gradually decreasing. He
argued that the structural imbalance in the U.S.
current account might be smaller than Obstfeld
and Rogoff suggested and therefore might
require a smaller exchange rate adjustment. He
examined how stabilization policies might influ-
ence the outcome of a large U.S. current account
adjustment and described how the economies of
other countries and regions could affect, and be
affected by, the adjustment. 
Drawing on research from the OECD, Visco
offered an alternative estimate of the effect of an
adjustment in the U.S. current account on the
foreign exchange value of the dollar. In arriving
at his estimate, Visco attributed part of the cur-
rent account deficit to cyclical factors, lowering
the structural component to around 3
1⁄2 percent
of GDP . Visco also argued that, due to a variety
of factors, a small current account deficit of
around 
1⁄2 percent of GDP was sustainable in the
United States. Using Obstfeld and Rogoff’s
model and assuming no short-run rigidities,
Visco estimated that a reduction in the structural
deficit from 3
1⁄2 percent to 
1⁄2 percent of GDP
would require an 8.5 percent depreciation of the
dollar—somewhat less than the Obstfeld-Rogoff
estimate. But in Visco’s view estimates like these
may be misleading because the adjustment role
of the exchange rate will depend on the type of
shock that triggers the current account adjust-
ment and on the monetary policy response. 
How should monetary policymakers respond?
Following the discussion of how economic
integration affects macroeconomic stability, a
panel of central bankers discussed how mone-
tary policy should respond to the macroeco-
nomic challenges. 
Donald Brash highlighted four issues related
to global economic integration that affect cen-
tral banks. First, increasing foreign trade is caus-
ing greater integration of countries and regions
and thereby increasing the appeal of regional
currency zones. Second, growing integration
may have caused economies to become less
inflation prone. Third, global financial institu-
tions are developing at an accelerating rate, rais-
ing issues about financial regulation and the
transmission of monetary policy. And fourth,
the increasing speed with which capital flows
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central banks to achieve domestic objectives. 
Focusing primarily on the last issue, Brash
described how monetary policy in New Zealand
has responded to increased economic integration.
Two key challenges are the heightened response
of capital flows to changes in monetary policy
and the disruptive effects of exchange-rate cycles
to the macroeconomy. Among the key ingredi-
ents to successful management of external or
internal shocks in an open economy are “clear,
transparent, and credible objectives” and “effec-
tive risk management.” The specific approach in
New Zealand has been to adopt an explicit infla-
tion target and to maintain floating exchange
rates and an open capital account. (Brash’s paper
is reprinted in this issue of Economic Review.)
Guillermo Ortiz discussed the benefits and
risks of globalization from the perspective of
developing countries. He argued that the most
attractive monetary regime for developing
counties with open capital accounts is a flexible
exchange-rate regime. After reviewing the
advantages and disadvantages of such a regime,
Ortiz identified policies that would maximize
the benefits. He also discussed recent monetary
policy in Mexico in the context of a flexible
exchange-rate regime, increasing globalization,
and high uncertainty. 
Ortiz reviewed several benefits and costs of
floating exchange rates. On the positive side,
floating exchange rates limit the volatility of
production and help prevent the buildup of
external imbalances. They allow central banks
to pursue independent domestic monetary poli-
cies. They encourage capital to flow to longer
term portfolio and direct investments, and they
eliminate any private-sector perception that the
government will guarantee a particular value for
the currency. On the downside, flexible
exchange rates lead to higher risk premiums and
therefore higher domestic interest rates. Flexible
exchange rates may contain limited information
if markets are thin or dominated by a few
agents. And, hedging exchange-rate risk may be
costly if derivatives markets are not well devel-
oped. While these costs are magnified in finan-
cially fragile economies, they can be lessened
through public and private-sector efforts to
reduce financial vulnerability. 
Eugenio Domingo Solans discussed an
approach to monetary policy called bounded dis-
cretion. He defined bounded discretion as “a for-
mula able to combine the judgment and
flexibility of discretion with the discipline that is
achieved in the case of rule-based policy design
through the automatic feedback between the
target and the instrument variables.” In such an
approach, reputation and institutional con-
straints would substitute for the automatic feed-
back component of a rule-based monetary
policy. Solans argued that bounded discretion
corresponded to the monetary policy framework
of the Eurosystem. 
In responding to the challenges of globaliza-
tion, Solans said monetary policy should be
credible, realistic, and efficient. It should involve
“a lack of activism, combined with smoothness,
judgment, flexibility, precommitment, time
consistency, transparency, and accountability.
These requirements are better fulfilled by a dis-
cretionary policy design supported by central
bank independence, pre-established prioritized
objectives, a clearly specified encompassing
strategy, enhanced communication, and demo-
cratic control.”
Overview panel
The symposium concluded with overview com-
ments and perspectives on the future from Mar-
tin Feldstein, Stanley Fischer, and Jacob Frenkel. 
Feldstein reviewed several benefits of eco-
nomic integration that are often overlooked.
First, greater international capital flows allow
investors more opportunity to reduce risk
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spread Anglo-American concepts of corporate
governance, accounting practices, and legal tra-
ditions. And third, integration has constrained
governments’ ability to enact bad fiscal and reg-
ulatory policy. 
Feldstein also described several benefits from
globalization caused by increases in foreign
direct investment. In particular, foreign direct
investment fosters technology transfer. It allows
the labor force in the host country to become
better trained. It generates profits and tax rev-
enues in the host country. And it allows the for-
eign owners of capital to exploit economies of
scale. While the host country may tax profits
from foreign direct investment, the source coun-
try benefits when the investment is financed by
funds borrowed in the host country.
Feldstein then gave his perspective on the
causes of recent economic crises and policies to
prevent them in the future. The domestic causes,
which he said were exacerbated by the IMF’s
response, fell into three groups—exchange rate
misalignments that created current account
imbalances, a mismatch between short-term for-
eign exchange liabilities and foreign exchange
reserves, and weak banking sectors under poor
supervision. The way to prevent crises in the
future is to avoid exchange-rate misalignments
and balance-sheet mismatches and to strengthen
banking systems and regulations. 
Fischer discussed how globalization affected
people’s daily lives and why globalization gener-
ates political controversy. He distinguished
between valid concerns for better globalization
and concerns that were purely self-serving. He
then proposed measures to address the valid
concerns and pondered the future. 
Fischer argued that globalization and the insti-
tutions involved in making it work better should
be defended. But, at the same time, he sug-
gested several areas for improvement. Interna-
tional labor and environmental standards could
be crafted in a reasonable and nonprotectionist
way. Volatility of international capital flows
could be reduced by the abandonment of “fixed-
but-adjustable” pegs in favor of either floating or
clearly fixed exchange rates. Advanced countries
could reduce trade barriers in agriculture and
textiles—areas of key concern to developing
countries. International organizations could con-
sider giving developing countries more decision-
making influence. And, local and national
cultures should be maintained and nurtured. 
Fischer noted that, despite complaints, trade
liberalization is continuing and most emerging
market economies are maintaining open capital
accounts. Looking ahead, he predicted that, if
policymakers managed the process well, global-
ization would potentially benefit all countries
and likely benefit most. 
Frenkel discussed how economic integration
was shrinking distances and compressing time.
Well functioning capital markets transform
future expectations into the present, causing
small policy changes to affect the market, not
just through demand effects, but also through
expectations of future policy. As a result, finan-
cial market volatility is amplified. The compres-
sion of time also means that, with the benefit of
technology and access to information, emerging
market economies can jump across stages of
development without going through the entire
development process. In addition, because
expectations of the future affect the economy
today, policymakers have greater incentive to
take the right actions. The benefits from doing
so accrue faster than in the past. 
Frenkel also drew implications for exchange-
rate regimes from the compression of time. In
effect, the short run is determined by the long
run and there is no in between. Thus, if an
exchange-rate regime is nonsustainable in the
long run, it will not work in the short run. For
example, a pegged-but-not-fixed exchange-rate
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exchange rate at the wrong level for too long.
The regime will collapse and credibility will be
lost. Because the regime is not credible in the
long run, it will not be credible in the short run.
Therefore, countries will have to adopt either
“very fixed” or “very flexed” exchange-rate
regimes. By the same logic, Frenkel argued that
exchange-market intervention is futile.
Frenkel concluded by urging policymakers to
address problems now while the world economy
is relatively strong. “You should fix the roof on a
sunny day rather than on a rainy day.” The only
issue, he said, is political will.
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